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SWISS CHEESE THAT’S ALL HOLE: HOW USING 
READING MATERIAL TO PROVE CRIMINAL INTENT 
THREATENS THE PROPENSITY RULE 
Jessica Murphy 
Abstract: In United States v. Curtin, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that Federal 
Rule of Evidence 404(b) permits a defendant’s reading material to be introduced as evidence 
of his intent to commit a crime.  The decision expressly overruled Guam v. Shymanovitz, an 
earlier Ninth Circuit opinion that called the admissibility of reading material into question. 
This Note argues that the Curtin decision failed to appreciate the extent to which reading 
material may reveal only a defendant’s propensity to commit a charged crime, rather than his 
or her intent to do so. To reduce the possibility that impermissible propensity evidence will 
be erroneously admitted, this Note proposes that courts considering the admissibility of 
reading material under Rule 404(b) more closely examine whether the evidence requires an 
inference about the defendant’s character or propensity to commit crimes. 
INTRODUCTION 
A man and his wife take a romantic walk on the beach to celebrate 
their anniversary. On the walk, the woman is fatally shot. Her husband 
sustains several life-threatening gunshot wounds to the right side of his 
chest, but he survives.1 Upon regaining consciousness, the man tells the 
police that a gunman approached the couple during their walk and shot 
them both. During the investigation, the police discover that the man has 
had several affairs over the course of his three-year marriage and has 
been named the beneficiary of his wife’s two-million dollar life 
insurance policy. A search of the couple’s home reveals a copy of Laci: 
Inside the Laci Peterson Murder,2 a true crime novel about a man 
convicted of killing his wife, as well as a first-aid book that includes 
chest diagrams and a chapter on treating gunshot wounds to the chest. 
The husband is charged with his wife’s murder. At trial, the prosecution 
                                                     
1. This hypothetical is loosely based upon the true story of Justin and April Barber, who were 
shot on a Florida beach in 2002. See Dennis Murphy, Murder in the Moonlight, MSNBC, Sept. 8, 
2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14738060/. During Justin’s trial for April’s murder, the 
prosecution introduced evidence that Justin had conducted a Google search for the terms “trauma,” 
“cases,” “gunshot,” “right,” and “chest” six months prior to the shooting. Id. The prosecution 
proposed a theory that Justin, who had sustained wounds only on the right side of his chest, had 
murdered April and shot himself to conceal the crime. Largely on the strength of this evidence, 
Justin was convicted of murdering his wife. Id. 
2. MICHAEL FLEEMAN, LACI: INSIDE THE LACI PETERSON MURDER (2003). 
MURPHY_FINAL.DOC 6/10/2008 5:53:12 PM 
Washington Law Review Vol. 83:317, 2008 
318 
offers the theory that the defendant killed his wife and then shot himself 
to make his robbery story seem more plausible. To prove the defendant’s 
intent to commit murder, the prosecution offers the first-aid book and the 
true crime novel into evidence.  Citing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
United States v. Curtin,3 the court admits both books over the 
defendant’s objections. The defendant is convicted. 
Think about the books you have on your bookshelf. If you were 
charged with a crime, could your reading material be used against you at 
trial under certain circumstances? In light of Curtin,4 should you 
reconsider purchasing a copy of The Bad Girl’s Guide to the Open 
Road?5 Should you throw out your copy of How to Pad Your Expense 
Report . . . And Get Away With It!?6 Could your copy of Crime and 
Punishment7 prove the intent element of a murder prosecution? Could 
Les Miserables8 prove your intent to commit theft? When appellate 
courts uphold the admission of reading material to prove an element of a 
crime, they emphasize that the law does not criminalize the possession 
of reading material itself.9 Closer examination, however, reveals that a 
defendant is punished for his literary choices anytime a jury infers 
criminal intent from the defendant’s lawful exercise of his First 
Amendment rights.10 The potential introduction of reading material as 
evidence of a defendant’s intent can chill the exercise of First 
Amendment rights and discourage individuals from reading books that 
                                                     
3. 489 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
4. Id. at 956 (holding that a defendant’s reading material may be admissible to prove his or her 
intent to commit a crime). 
5. CAMERON TUTTLE & SUSANNAH BETTAG, THE BAD GIRL’S GUIDE TO THE OPEN ROAD 
(Chronicle Books 1999). This tongue-in-cheek manual for women traveling on road trips together 
includes advice on multiple ways to avoid being cited for a speeding ticket or arrested for DUI, as 
well as information on “non-gun weapons you already own.” Id. at 94. 
6. EMPLOYEE X, HOW TO PAD YOUR EXPENSE REPORT . . . AND GET AWAY WITH IT! (Easy 
Money Press rev. ed. 2003). In addition to offering advice on the best ways to pad an expense 
report, this book also offers advice on the best excuses to use if the reader gets caught. In a trial for 
embezzlement, this book could be admissible to prove an individual’s intent to embezzle funds.  See 
Curtin, 489 F.3d at 956. 
7. FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (Sidney Monas, trans., Signet Classics 
2006) (1866). 
8. VICTOR HUGO, LES MISERABLES (Lee Fahnestock & Norman MacAfee, trans., Signet Classics 
1987) (1862). 
9. See Curtin, 489 F.3d at 956; United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 111−12 (2d Cir. 1998). 
10. Helen A. Anderson, The Freedom to Speak and the Freedom to Listen: The Admissibility of 
the Criminal Defendant’s Taste in Entertainment, 83 OR. L. REV. 899, 933 (2004). 
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could be considered incriminating.11 Because free speech is “the matrix, 
the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom,”12 
courts should be wary of any practice that infringes upon or chills this 
right.13 
In Curtin, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the practice of 
admitting reading material under Federal Rule of Evidence (Rule) 
404(b) to prove the defendant’s intent to commit the charged crime.14 
This Note asserts that cases considering the admissibility of reading 
material have failed to provide a consistent framework for analyzing this 
kind of evidence.  These cases have also exacerbated existing confusion 
about the distinction between a defendant’s propensity to commit a 
crime and his intent to do so. Part I provides an overview of the various 
ways in which prosecutors use a defendant’s reading material in federal 
court to prove the defendant’s criminal intent, as well as some of the 
evidentiary arguments defendants offer to exclude such evidence. Part II 
focuses on the use of reading material in the Ninth Circuit, analyzing 
Curtin and the case it overruled, Guam v. Shymanovitz.15 Part III 
discusses the reasoning of the Curtin opinion, concluding that the court 
erred by failing to consider whether the admitted reading material 
violated the 404(b) propensity rule. Finally, Part IV suggests a 
framework for evaluating the admissibility of reading material. 
                                                     
11. See Curtin, 489 F.3d at 959 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (“We ought to be wary when the 
government wants to use what people read against them . . . . Readers should not have to hide what 
they read to be safe from the government.”); see also Guam v. Shymanovitz, 157 F.3d 1154, 1159 
(9th Cir. 1998) (“Any defendant with a modest library of just a few books and magazines would 
undoubtedly possess reading material containing descriptions of numerous acts of criminal 
conduct . . . . To allow prosecutors to parade before the jury snippets from a defendant’s 
library . . . would compel all persons to choose the contents of their libraries with considerable care; 
for it is the innocent, and not just the guilty, who are sometimes the subject of good-faith 
prosecutions.”), overruled by United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
12. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 
565 (1969) (“If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a 
man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read . . . .”). 
13. See Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044, 1052 (Colo. 2002) (“Any 
governmental action that interferes with the willingness of customers to purchase books, or 
booksellers to sell books . . . implicates First Amendment concerns.”); see also United States v. 
Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1209 (9th Cir. 1979) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting) (“Freedom of speech would 
be totally destroyed if the shadow of the prosecutor fell across the pages of the books we read.”). 
14. Curtin, 489 F.3d at 956. 
15. 157 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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I. COURTS HAVE ADMITTED READING MATERIAL AS 
EVIDENCE WITHOUT ESTABLISHING A CLEAR 
FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING ADMISSIBILITY 
For decades, prosecutors have offered reading material as evidence, 
most often to prove the defendant’s state of mind.16 Extrinsic evidence17 
of a defendant’s state of mind becomes particularly important when the 
defendant places his state of mind at issue, perhaps by asserting that he 
did not intend to commit the crime but merely fantasized about doing 
so.18 When a defendant makes his state of mind a disputed issue, his 
mental state must be ascertained by drawing inferences from his 
conduct.19 Possession of lawful reading material can be a valuable tool 
for prosecutors because it is considered extrinsic conduct that can 
provide insight into the actor’s state of mind.20 
A survey of relevant case law reveals that there is no clear standard 
for the admission of reading material as evidence in federal court. 
Although the First Amendment protects an individual’s right to read 
anything he or she wishes to read,21 “[t]he First Amendment . . . does not 
                                                     
16. See infra Part I.A−C. 
17. “[E]vidence is ‘intrinsic’ when the evidence of the other act and the evidence of the crime 
charged are ‘inextricably intertwined’ or both acts are part of a ‘single criminal episode’ or the other 
acts were ‘necessary preliminaries’ to the crime charged.” United States v. Williams, 900 F.2d 823, 
825 (5th Cir. 1990). Evidence that does not meet this test is considered “extrinsic.” Id.  
18. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988) (“Extrinsic acts evidence may be 
critical to the establishment of the truth as to a disputed issue, especially when that issue involves 
the actor’s state of mind and the only means of ascertaining that mental state is by drawing 
inferences from conduct.”); see also Curtin, 489 F.3d at 952 (“We routinely have held that 
circumstances surrounding an alleged crime become more relevant when the defendant makes his 
intent a disputed issue.”); Donald S. Yamagami, Comment, Prosecuting Cyber-Pedophiles: How 
Can Intent Be Shown in a Virtual World in Light of the Fantasy Defense?, 41 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 547, 564–65 (2001) (discussing the unique challenges of proving a defendant’s intent when 
the defendant argues that he only fantasized about committing the crime but did not intend to 
commit it); Tatsha Robertson, Across the Nation, School Attack Plots Pose Legal Challenge, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 16, 2001, at A1 (discussing challenges in prosecuting a case where the 
defendant asserts that he did not intend to bomb the school but rather only fantasized about doing 
so); Ihosvani Rodriguez, Net Sex Cases Tougher to Win; Bexar Prosecutors Haven’t Been Seeing as 
Much Success Lately, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Jan. 25, 2004, at 5B (discussing the 
challenges prosecutors face when a defendant charged with a sex crime argues that he did not intend 
to commit the charged act). 
19. See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 685. 
20. See Curtin, 489 F.3d at 948−50 (discussing defendant’s argument that he never intended to 
have sexual relations with a minor and the prosecution’s subsequent introduction of stories found on 
the defendant’s person that involved adults engaging in sexual relations with minors). 
21. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). 
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prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a 
crime or to prove motive or intent.”22 For this reason, First Amendment 
challenges to the introduction of reading material as evidence have been 
largely unsuccessful.23 With that avenue closed, defendants must resort 
to exclusion through the Federal Rules of Evidence, arguing that 
evidence of their literary habits is either irrelevant under Rules 401 and 
402, unduly prejudicial under Rule 403, an impermissible use of 
character evidence under Rule 404, or inadmissible under a combination 
of these rules.24 
Reading material has been excluded as irrelevant under Rules 401 and 
402 when the charged crime did not include intent as an element.25 If a 
court accepts the relevancy of the evidence, a defendant may argue that 
the reading material is unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403.26 Appellate 
courts, however, rarely find that the admission of reading material 
constituted reversible error.27 Even if found to be unfairly prejudicial, 
the admission of reading material rarely constitutes reversible error.28 
Finally, two courts of appeal outside the Ninth Circuit have considered 
whether the admission of lawful reading material violates Rule 404’s 
prohibition against character evidence, but have reached opposing 
conclusions.29 The Eighth Circuit held that the defendant’s reading 
material did violate the propensity rule, while the Sixth Circuit held that 
the reading material was properly offered under the 404(b) intent 
exception.30 
                                                     
22. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993). 
23. See United States v. Allen, 341 F.3d 870, 886 n.23 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the defendant’s 
argument that the introduction of Nazi-related literature violated his rights to free speech and 
association under the First Amendment); United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 111−12 (2d Cir. 
1998) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the admission of terrorist reading material violated 
his First Amendment rights). 
24. See infra Parts I.A–C and accompanying text. 
25. See infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
26. See infra notes 49−53. 
27. See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
28. See infra note 53 and accompanying text. 
29. See United States v. Johnson, 439 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Stotts, 176 F.3d 
880 (6th Cir. 1999). 
30. Johnson, 439 F.3d at 889; Stotts, 176 F.3d at 890–91; see infra notes 73−87 and 
accompanying text. 
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A. The Relevance of Reading Material Under Rules 401 and 402 
Depends Primarily on Whether Intent Is an Element of the 
Charged Crime 
Rules 401 and 402 establish the general framework for the admission 
of relevant evidence. Rule 402 mandates that relevant evidence should 
be admitted at trial, unless excluded by another evidentiary rule, such as 
Rule 403 or 404, by the United States Constitution, or by an Act of 
Congress.31 Under Rule 401, evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency 
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would 
be without the evidence.”32 Therefore, relevant evidence must fulfill two 
prongs: the materiality prong and the probative worth prong.33 For 
evidence to be material, it must bear on an element of a charge or 
defense.34 Once the materiality prong is satisfied, “[t]he probative worth 
prong sets an extremely low standard” for admission of evidence, 
requiring only that the evidence have any tendency to make a material 
fact more or less probable.35 
Courts have rejected the defendant’s reading materials as immaterial 
under Rule 401 when the charged crime does not require the prosecution 
to prove the defendant’s state of mind.36 For example, in United States v. 
Ellis,37 the prosecution successfully introduced the defendant’s copy of 
                                                     
31. FED. R. EVID. 402. 
32. FED. R. EVID. 401. 
33. See Peter Nicolas, De Novo Review in Deferential Robes?: A Deconstruction of the Standard 
of Review of Evidentiary Errors in the Federal System, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 531, 540−41 (2004); 
1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 637 (John W. Strong, et al. eds., 5th ed. 1999) [hereinafter 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE]. 
34. See Nicolas, supra note 33, at 540−41; MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, supra note 33, at 
637. 
35. Nicolas, supra note 33, at 541; see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, supra note 33, at 
640–41 (“An item of evidence, being but a single link in the chain of proof, need not prove 
conclusively the proposition for which it is offered . . . . It is enough if the item could reasonably 
show that a fact is slightly more probable than it would appear without that evidence.”). 
36. See United States v. Holt, 170 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that the trial court 
improperly admitted evidence that the defendant sold The Anarchist Cookbook in his store because 
the book was “entirely unrelated” to the charged crime of gun possession); United States v. Ellis, 
147 F.3d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the admission of a book about guns and firearms 
where the defendant was charged with possession of guns and firearms but intent was not an 
element of the charge); United States v. McCrea, 583 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1978) (expressing 
vexation at the prosecution’s introduction of reading material that was “entirely unnecessary” to 
support the charged crime of possessing an unregistered destructive device). 
37. 147 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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The Anarchist Cookbook38 to show that the defendant intended to 
commit the charged crime of knowingly possessing stolen explosives.39 
On appeal, a Ninth Circuit panel reversed the defendant’s conviction 
because intent was not an element of the charged crime and “[o]ne 
cannot logically infer possession of firearms and explosives . . . from 
mere possession of books about guns, bombs, and related subjects.”40 
However, once the evidence is found to be material, the low probative 
worth standard, which requires only that the evidence have “any 
tendency”41 to make a material fact “more probable or less probable,”42 
provides little ground for exclusion.43 
B. When Applying Rule 403, Appellate Courts Rarely Find Abuse of 
Discretion or Reversible Error in the Introduction of Reading 
Material 
When a trial court has deemed a defendant’s reading material relevant 
under Rules 401 and 402, the evidence still may be excluded under Rule 
403.44 Rule 403 permits a trial court to exclude evidence when the 
probative value of the evidence is “substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence.”45 The rule grants considerable 
discretion to the trial judge to make this determination,46 and appellate 
                                                     
38. The Anarchist Cookbook, first published by William Powell in 1971 to protest the United 
States’ involvement in the Vietnam War, contains instructions for manufacturing explosives, drugs 
and other illegal items. WILLIAM POWELL, THE ANARCHIST COOKBOOK (1971). 
39. Ellis, 147 F.3d at 1134−35. 
40. Id. at 1135 (quoting United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1187 (9th Cir. 1979)). 
41. FED. R. EVID. 401. 
42. Id. 
43. See United States v. Patterson 431 F.3d 832, 840 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that an admitted 
magazine was probative of whether the defendant used marijuana); United States v. Stotts, 176 F.3d 
880, 891 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that bomb-making books were probative of whether the defendant 
intended to use the components found in his home to create destructive devices); United States v. 
Ford, 22 F.3d 374, 381−82 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that the defendant’s book about 
methamphetamine manufacturing was a “tool of the drug trafficking trade” and therefore probative 
of his intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana). 
44. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
45. Id. 
46. See 1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 4.12, at 
632−33 (3d ed. 2007). 
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courts will not find error in the admission of evidence unless the trial 
court committed an “abuse of discretion.”47 
Once a trial court admits reading material into evidence, a defendant 
faces a difficult road on appeal. Because Rule 403 requires that the 
danger of unfair prejudice “substantially outweigh” the probative value 
of the evidence, an appellate court is unlikely to overturn a trial judge’s 
decision to admit reading material that is highly probative of the 
defendant’s intent to commit a crime.48 Furthermore, the deferential 
standard of review means that an appellate court will rarely find that the 
trial court erred in admitting reading material, even when the resulting 
potential for prejudice to the defendant is very high.49 For example, in 
United States v. Ford,50 the First Circuit held that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion by allowing the prosecution to admit the defendant’s 
book, Secrets of Methamphetamine Manufacture,51 to prove the 
defendant’s intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana.52 Even if an 
appellate court does find that a trial court abused its discretion and 
thereby committed error, a defendant’s conviction will not be overturned 
if the error is deemed “harmless.”53 Once a trial court admits reading 
                                                     
47. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174 n.1 (1997); see also United States v. Baker, 432 
F.3d 1189, 1202 (11th Cir. 2005) (“An abuse of discretion arises when the district court’s decision 
rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an improper 
application of law to fact.”). 
48. See United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 111 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding admission of a 
bomb-making book that provided an exact blueprint for the bomb that the defendants were charged 
with detonating because the probative value of the evidence was “significant”). 
49. See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 431 F.3d 832, 839–40 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a copy of High Times Magazine because defendant’s 
possession of the magazine made it more likely that the defendant used marijuana); United States v. 
Allen, 341 F.3d 870, 887 n.25 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in admitting the defendants’ Nazi-related literature “in light of the government’s heavy burden of 
proving racial animus”); United States v. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d 392, 398 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the probative value of “racist and 
inflammatory literature” outweighed any prejudicial effect); United States v. Ford, 22 F.3d 374, 
381−82 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that the prejudicial effect of Secrets of Methamphetamine 
Manufacture did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the book, even though the 
defendant was not charged with distributing or manufacturing methamphetamine, because the book 
is “a tool of the drug trafficking trade”). 
50. 22 F.3d 374 (1st Cir. 1994). 
51. UNCLE FESTER, SECRETS OF METHAMPHETAMINE MANUFACTURE (Festering Publications 7th 
ed. 2005). 
52. Ford, 22 F.3d at 381−82. 
53. See, e.g., United States v. Walters, 351 F.3d 159, 168-69 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
admission of The Anarchist Cookbook did not support reversal in light of the other evidence against 
the defendant); United States v. Rogers, 270 F.3d 1076, 1081 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the 
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material, the defendant will have difficulty showing either that the trial 
court admitted the material in error or that an erroneous admission 
substantially affected the trial outcome.54 
C. Even if Reading Material Is Highly Relevant, Its Introduction 
Violates the Rule 404 Propensity Rule if It Is Used to Show that the 
Defendant Had a Propensity to Commit the Charged Crime 
Rule 404, the so-called “propensity rule”55 forbids the admission of 
evidence of a defendant’s character or actions when such evidence is 
used to show that the defendant has a propensity to commit a certain 
type of crime.56 The term “character evidence,” which is often used 
synonymously with the term “propensity evidence,” is generally defined 
as “evidence offered solely to prove a person acted in conformity with a 
trait of character on a given occasion.”57 For example, evidence of a 
defendant’s criminal history is inadmissible if it is used to show that the 
defendant has previously engaged in criminal behavior and is therefore 
more likely to have committed the charged crime.58 The Rule does not 
reject character evidence on relevancy grounds.59 In fact, the evidence 
may be highly relevant. Other things being equal, the fact that a person 
committed a crime in the past makes him “statistically more likely than a 
                                                     
erroneous admission of irrelevant, misleading, and prejudicial portions of The Anarchist Cookbook, 
including the title, did not justify reversal of the defendant’s conviction); United States v. McCrea, 
583 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that the erroneous admission of irrelevant and 
prejudicial literature was harmless in light of “overwhelming evidence which [was] properly 
admitted”). But see, e.g., United States v. Ellis, 147 F.3d 1131, 1136–37 (9th Cir. 1998) (reversing 
the defendant’s conviction because there was “grave doubt” as to whether the erroneous and 
prejudicial admission of the defendant’s book affected the verdict) (citing United States v. Collicott, 
92 F.3d 973, 984 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
54. See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text. 
55. E.g., United States v. Coleman, 22 F.3d 126, 132 (7th Cir. 1994); Thompson v. United States, 
546 A.2d 414, 418 (D.C. 1988); 2 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 404.10[1], at 404-12.1 
(Joseph M. McLaughlin, et. al. eds., 2d ed. 2007). 
56. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (“Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not 
admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular 
occasion . . . .”); FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible 
to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”). 
57. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 186, supra note 33, at 649; see also United States v. Johnson, 
439 F.3d 884, 887 (8th Cir. 2006). 
58. See Johnson, 439 F.3d at 887; United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 183, 192 (2d Cir. 2004). 
59. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475−76 (1948). Michelson was decided before the 
Federal Rules of Evidence were introduced but has been cited with approval in cases decided after 
the Federal Rules were adopted. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691 (1988). 
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law-abiding citizen to commit a second similar crime.”60 Rather, the 
propensity rule is a policy decision, grounded in the common law,61 that 
supports “the underlying premise of our criminal system, that the 
defendant must be tried for what he did, not who he is.”62 
There are exceptions to the propensity rule. For instance, Rule 404(b), 
a “rule of inclusion,”63 allows a defendant’s “other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts” to be introduced into evidence when the prosecution does not offer 
the evidence to show that the defendant has a propensity to act in a 
certain way.64 This rule only governs extrinsic evidence; it does not 
provide a framework for analyzing evidence that is “inextricably 
intertwined” with the charged crime.65 Although Rule 404(b) is most 
often used to introduce evidence of illegal acts, such as a prior criminal 
conviction, a defendant’s possession of lawful reading material has also 
been admitted through this rule because Rule 404(b) applies to all prior 
acts, not merely those that are illegal.66 The language of Rule 404(b) 
suggests several permissible purposes for which other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts may be admitted as evidence: to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.”67 Thus, when a defendant argues that his reading material is 
                                                     
60. Thompson v. United States, 546 A.2d 414, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
61. Id. 
62. United States v. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006, 1013−14 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting United 
States v. Bradley, 5 F.3d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 1993)); see also Thompson, 546 A.2d at 419 (“[T]he 
now well-entrenched propensity rule is thought to be indispensable to the presumption of 
innocence.”). 
63. United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 944 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); see also United States v. 
Garcia, 291 F.3d 127, 136 (2d Cir. 2002) (“The Second Circuit evaluates Rule 404(b) evidence 
under an ‘inclusionary approach’ and allows evidence ‘for any purpose other than to show a 
defendant’s criminal propensity.’”) (quoting United States v. Pitre, 960 F.2d 1112, 1118 (2d Cir. 
1992)). But see 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 5239, at 432 (1978 & Supp. 2007) (“In retrospect, the phrasing of the inclusionary 
version [of Rule 404(b)] in the main volume [of FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE] is 
unfortunate as it has, perhaps, led some courts to describe Rule 404(b) as admitting all evidence of 
other crimes ‘unless the evidence tends to prove only the defendant’s criminal disposition.’”). 
64. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
65. United States v. Soliman, 813 F.2d 277, 279 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. 
Aleman, 592 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 1979)); see also United States v. Coleman, 78 F.3d 154, 156 
(5th Cir. 1996). “[E]vidence is ‘intrinsic’ when the evidence of the other act and the evidence of the 
crime charged are ‘inextricably intertwined’ or both acts are part of a ‘single criminal episode’ or 
the other acts were ‘necessary preliminaries’ to the crime charged.” United States v. Williams, 900 
F.2d 823, 825 (5th Cir. 1990). Evidence that does not meet this test is considered “extrinsic.” Id. 
66. Curtin, 489 F.3d at 943 n.3. 
67. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
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impermissible character or propensity evidence, the prosecution may 
respond by offering the evidence under Rule 404(b)’s intent exception.68 
Several courts have recognized that the Rule 404(b) intent exception 
has the capacity to swallow the general rule against admission of 
propensity evidence.69 The exception bleeds into the rule because it can 
be difficult, perhaps even impossible, to distinguish the intent to commit 
a criminal act from a predisposition to perform criminal acts.70 “Where 
the prior crime evidence is offered to prove the defendant’s ‘tendency’ 
or ‘mental attitude (intent) along that particular line of crime,’ we are 
admitting evidence ‘precisely for the reason that the original rule 
excluded it.’”71 To guard against the admission of propensity evidence, 
the critical inquiry, therefore, is not whether the evidence has any 
tendency to prove a material issue, such as intent, but rather whether the 
evidence “proves a material issue without requiring any inference to the 
defendant’s criminal disposition.”72 
Courts have excluded evidence if conclusions about an individual’s 
intent first require an inference about his character or propensity to act in 
a certain way.73  For example, in United States v. Johnson,74 an Eighth 
                                                     
68. See Curtin, 489 F.3d at 942. 
69. E.g., United States v. Matthews, 431 F.3d 1296, 1313 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005) (Tjoflat, J., 
concurring); see also United States v. Macedo, 371 F.3d 957, 966 (7th Cir. 2004) (“We have long 
recognized that the permissible use of prior bad act evidence to prove intent or lack of mistake may 
have the potential impermissible side effect of allowing the jury to infer criminal propensity.”). 
70. Thompson v. United States, 546 A.2d 414, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also United States v. 
Jones, 389 F.3d 753, 756 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Propensity and intent are two different things, however, 
even if only a fine line sometimes distinguishes them.”), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 
545 U.S. 1125 (2005). 
71. Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b), 
608(b) and 609(a), 38 EMORY L.J. 135, 158 (1989) (quoting Julius Stone, The Role of Exclusion of 
Similar Fact Evidence in America, 51 HARV. L. REV. 988, 1032−33 (1938)). 
72. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 63, at 432; see also Matthews, 431 F.3d at 1313 n.1  (Tjoflat, 
J., concurring) (“If the inferential chain must run through the defendant’s character—and his or her 
predisposition towards a criminal intent—the evidence is squarely on the propensity side of the 
elusive line.”); Ordover, supra note 71, at 158. 
73. See United States v. Johnson, 439 F.3d 884, 887−89 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that 
pornographic stories depicting violence against young girls were inadmissible under Rule 404(b) to 
prove that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed child pornography because the 
conclusion that the defendant intended to possess child pornography required the conclusion that the 
defendant had a “predisposition” or “inherent tendency” to possess child pornography); United 
States v. Heidebur, 122 F.3d 577, 581 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the evidence that the defendant 
abused his twelve-year-old stepdaughter was inadmissible to prove that he knowingly possessed 
pornographic photographs of her because the conclusion about the defendant’s state of mind 
required the conclusion that he had a propensity to commit that kind of crime). 
74. 439 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 2006). 
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Circuit panel excluded evidence that was offered to show the 
defendant’s intent, but merely showed the defendant’s propensity to 
commit the charged crime.75 In Johnson, the prosecution admitted the 
defendant’s lawful reading material, which described the violent rapes of 
two adolescent girls, to show that the defendant knowingly possessed 
unlawful photographs of minors “engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct.”76 Although the defendant did not dispute that he downloaded 
the child pornography files onto his computer, he argued that he 
“inadvertently downloaded the images while searching for legitimate 
online material.”77 On appeal, the prosecution asserted that the 
similarities between the stories and the violent acts depicted in some of 
the pictures showed that the defendant had an interest in that kind of 
sexual material and was therefore more likely to possess child 
pornography.78 The court disagreed, holding that the material was 
inadmissible under Rule 404(b) because the stories did not show the 
defendant’s knowledge or intent, but rather only showed that the 
defendant was the type of person who would possess child 
pornography.79 Additionally, the court found that the admission of the 
material was not harmless error and ordered a new trial.80 
In contrast to the Eighth Circuit’s analysis, the Sixth Circuit upheld 
the admission of reading material under Rule 404(b)’s intent exception 
without evaluating whether the evidence required an inference regarding 
the defendant’s propensity to commit crimes.81 In United States v. 
Stotts,82 the defendant was charged with using or carrying a destructive 
device during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense, as well as 
using or carrying an unassembled destructive device.83 Federal agents 
raided the defendant’s home after firemen observed an explosion at the 
                                                     
75. Id. at 888–89. 
76. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252 (West 2008); see also Johnson, 439 F.3d at 887. 
77. Id. at 888. 
78. Id. at 887−88. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 889. 
81. See United States v. Stotts, 176 F.3d 880, 890–91 (6th Cir. 1999). The Second Circuit has 
also upheld the admission of evidence that the defendant possessed child pornography under the 
404(b) intent exception. See United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 199 (2d Cir. 2006). Because 
child pornography is not lawful reading material, its possession and admission are beyond the scope 
of this article. 
82. 176 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 1999). 
83. Id. at 884. 
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defendant’s home.84 The Sixth Circuit panel held that “various bomb-
making books” found in the defendant’s residence were properly 
admitted to show that the explosion was caused by a destructive device, 
rather than the accidental commingling of chemicals, and that the 
defendant intended to build another destructive device using incendiary 
components found in his home.85 The books included The Anarchist 
Cookbook, Poor Man’s James Bond, and The Black Book of Revenge—
The Complete Manual of Hard-Core Dirty Tricks and Schemes.86 The 
appellate court noted that the books “instruct how to make bombs from 
common, everyday materials,” but neither it nor the district court 
discussed whether any of the books found in the defendant’s apartment 
actually contained instructions for assembling bombs from the physical 
materials found in the apartment.87 
In sum, the circuits that have addressed this issue have held that a 
defendant’s reading materials are admissible to show the defendant’s 
intent when intent is an element of the charged crime.88 However, at 
least one court has rejected a defendant’s reading material on the 
grounds that the reading material showed the defendant’s propensity to 
commit a crime, rather than his intent to do so.89 
II. UNITED STATES v. CURTIN OVERRULED A NINTH CIRCUIT 
BAN ON THE ADMISSION OF READING MATERIAL AS 
EVIDENCE OF A DEFENDANT’S CRIMINAL INTENT 
The use of reading material as evidence of a defendant’s intent has 
created controversy in the Ninth Circuit.  This controversy culminated in 
a closely decided en banc opinion that firmly established the 
admissibility of reading material under Rule 404(b).90 In 1998, Guam v. 
Shymanovitz held that reading material was inadmissible to prove a 
defendant’s intent to commit a crime.91 The court rejected the evidence 
                                                     
84. Id. at 883. 
85. Id. at 890−91. 
86. Id. at 883. 
87. See id. at 883−84, 890−91. 
88. See supra Part I.A. 
89. See United States v. Johnson, 439 F.3d 884, 888–89 (8th Cir. 2006). 
90. United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2007). 
91. Guam v. Shymanovitz, 157 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled by United States v. 
Curtin, 489 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
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on several grounds: irrelevant under Rule 401,92 unduly prejudicial 
under Rule 403,93 and as evidence of the defendant’s character in 
violation of Rule 404.94 Relying primarily on Shymanovitz, a Ninth 
Circuit panel in United States v. Curtin overturned the defendant’s 
conviction for crossing state lines with intent to have sexual relations 
with a minor because the trial court had erroneously admitted the 
defendant’s reading material as evidence of his intent.95 The Ninth 
Circuit agreed to hear the case en banc, eventually overruling 
Shymanovitz and upholding the admission of reading material under the 
Rule 404(b) intent exception.96 
A. Guam v. Shymanovitz Questioned the Admissibility of Reading 
Material to Prove Criminal Intent and Imposed a Ban on the 
Introduction of Reading Material Through Rule 404(b) 
In Shymanovitz, the Ninth Circuit addressed the question of whether 
sexually explicit magazines found in the defendant’s apartment were 
admissible under Rule 404(b) to show that the defendant “intentionally 
engaged in sexual contact for the purpose of sexual arousal or 
gratification.”97 The defendant, a middle school guidance counselor, was 
charged with sexually abusing eleven boys.98 During trial, a police 
officer described the graphic content of the magazines in detail, 
including an article about a father and son engaging in sexual conduct, 
and an article about a priest and a young boy engaging in sexual 
conduct.99 The defendant was convicted and sentenced to serve four 
consecutive life sentences plus twenty-one years.100 Appealing his 
conviction, the defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion 
in admitting testimony about his sexually explicit magazines.101 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit addressed the prosecution’s argument 
that the magazines were admissible under Guam’s equivalent to Rule 
                                                     
92. Id. at 1158. 
93. Id. at 1160. 
94. Id. at 1159. 
95. Id. at 1092. 
96. United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 953–56 (9th Cir. 2007). 
97. Shymanovitz, 157 F.3d at 1157. 
98. Id. at 1155. 
99. Id. at 1155−56. 
100. Id. at 1156−57. 
101. Id. at 1157. 
MURPHY_FINAL.DOC 6/10/2008 5:53:12 PM 
Swiss Cheese That’s All Hole 
331 
404(b)102 to prove the defendant’s intent to engage in sexual contact for 
the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.103 The court rejected this 
argument, holding that while the prosecution had to prove that the 
defendant intended to touch the victims, the elements of the sexual crime 
did not require the prosecution to prove that the defendant intended to 
touch the victims for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.104 
After analyzing the intent element of the criminal statute, the court 
proceeded to question whether possession of reading material could ever 
be relevant to show a defendant’s intent to engage in a specific kind of 
conduct.105 The court observed that, “at the very most,” the reading 
materials tended to show that the defendant had an interest in gay male 
erotica, “and not that he actually engaged in, or even had a propensity to 
engage in, any sexual conduct of any kind.”106 Furthermore, the court 
held that “possession of lawful reading material is simply not the type of 
conduct contemplated by Rule 404(b)” because Rule 404(b) 
contemplates only the introduction of “bad” acts.107 According to the 
court, “a wide gulf separates the act of possessing written descriptions or 
stories about criminal conduct from the act of committing the offenses 
described.”108 Finally, the court rejected the evidence under Rule 403, 
asserting that the evidence’s probative value was substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,109 and reversed the 
defendant’s conviction.110 
                                                     
102. 6 GUAM CODE ANN. § 404(b) (2006) is a rule of evidence identical to FED. R. EVID. 404(b) 
in all pertinent respects. 
103. Shymanovitz, 157 F.3d at 1157. 
104. Id. at 1158 (“[T]he charges based on sexual contact require the government to prove that any 
touching on Shymanovitz’ part was intentional, and that a reasonable person could construe the 
touching to be for a sexual purpose . . . . The test, under the sexual contact statute, is an objective 
not a subjective one. In short, it is the character of the touching that is at issue, not the purpose of 
the intentional toucher.”). 
105. Id. (“The mere possession of reading material that describes a particular type of activity 
makes it neither more nor less likely that a defendant would intentionally engage in the conduct 
described and thus fails to meet the test of relevancy under Rule 401.”); see also id. at 1158 n.8 
(“[W]e disagree with [other] cases’ holdings that a defendant’s possession of reading materials 
depicting or describing criminal conduct tends to establish that the defendant engages in or has 
engaged in such conduct.”). 
106. Id. at 1158−59. 
107. Id. at 1159. The court does not explicitly define a “bad” act, but suggests that it encompasses 
“certain types of conduct generally condemned by society.” See id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 1160. 
110. Id. at 1161. 
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B. In United States v. Curtin, an En Banc Ninth Circuit Panel 
Unequivocally Upheld the Admissibility of Reading Material 
Under Rule 404(b) 
United States v. Curtin involved a sting operation designed to 
apprehend sexual predators who targeted minors over the Internet.111 
The defendant, a California resident, had several Internet chat 
conversations with an adult detective posing as “Christy,” a fourteen-
year-old girl.112 After several conversations, the defendant and “Christy” 
agreed to meet in Las Vegas, Nevada.113 When the defendant arrived at 
the agreed upon location, law enforcement officials arrested him and 
charged him with crossing state lines with the intent to engage in a 
sexual act with a juvenile in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b).114 At trial, 
the defendant argued that he did not have the requisite intent because he 
thought the individual with whom he corresponded was an adult woman 
pretending to be a young girl.115 
To rebut this defense, the prosecution successfully introduced graphic 
sexual stories that were found on a personal digital assistant (PDA) in 
the defendant’s possession at the time of his arrest.116 The stories 
contained a wide variety of sexually deviant acts, and the prosecution 
specifically sought to introduce stories that involved incestuous sexual 
relations between adults and minors.117 The trial court instructed the jury 
to consider the stories for the limited purpose of evaluating the 
defendant’s intent, not his proclivity to commit illicit sexual acts.118 
Curtin was convicted and appealed his conviction to the Ninth Circuit, 
arguing that his stories were improperly admitted propensity evidence 
under Rule 404(b) and that their admission was unduly prejudicial under 
Rule 403.119 A three-judge panel interpreted Shymanovitz as imposing a 
ban on the introduction of reading material through the Rule 404(b) 
intent exception.120 Relying on Shymanovitz, the appellate court held that 
                                                     
111. United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 936 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
112. Id. at 937–38. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 938. 
115. Id. at 938−39. 
116. Id. at 939−40. 
117. Id. at 941–42. 
118. Id. at 941. 
119. Id. at 942. 
120. See United States v. Curtin, 443 F.3d 1084, 1090−94 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc, 489 
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the stories were “no more than character evidence introduced to show 
propensity,” and remanded the case for a new trial.121 
The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc to reevaluate the 
admissibility of reading material.122 In the opinion written by Judge 
Trott, who dissented in the original Curtin decision, the eight-judge 
majority explicitly rejected the Shymanovitz rule requiring that acts 
admitted under Rule 404(b) be “bad” acts,123 as well as any bright-line 
rule excluding literature as evidence of a defendant’s intent to commit a 
crime.124 Citing Huddleston v. United States125 throughout the opinion, 
the Curtin court also held that the defendant’s reading material became 
more relevant because he had put his intent “at issue” by asserting that 
he had merely fantasized about having sexual relations with minors.126 
Using the Rule 401 standard of admissibility—that the evidence have 
any tendency to make a material fact more or less probable than it would 
be without the evidence—the court concluded that the stories were 
relevant and admissible to show the defendant’s intent to engage in 
                                                     
F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2007). Although the Curtin panel interpreted Shymanovitz as imposing a 
complete ban on the use of a defendant’s reading material to show his or her intent to commit a 
crime, a Ninth Circuit panel admitted reading material as evidence of a defendant’s intent five years 
after Shymanovitz was decided. See United States v. Allen, 341 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 2003), In Allen, 
the court upheld the admission of the defendants’ “Nazi-related literature” over the defendants’ First 
Amendment and Rule 403 objections. Id at 885–88. The defendants were charged with 
“intimidating or interfering with a person’s housing rights on account of ‘race’ or ‘color.’” Id. at 
887. Distinguishing Shymanovitz, the court observed, “[k]ey to our reasoning [in Shymanovitz] was 
the fact that the testimony was highly prejudicial and was not relevant to proving any of the 
elements of the crime for which the defendant was convicted.” Id. at 887 n.25. Unlike Shymanovitz, 
the charged crime in Allen required the government to prove that the defendant’s actions were 
racially motivated. Id. The court did not consider Rule 404(b) in reaching its decision, suggesting 
that Allen characterized the Shymanovitz Rule 404(b) discussion as dicta. See id. 
121. Curtin, 443 F.3d at 1093 n.2. 
122. Curtin, 489 F.3d at 937. 
123. Id. at 943 n.3 (“The other ‘act’ does not need to be ‘bad,’ just relevant in such a way as to 
avoid being nothing more than character or propensity evidence.”). 
124. Id. at 953−56. 
125. 485 U.S. 681 (1988). This case resolved a circuit split pertaining to the standard of proof a 
trial court should apply when evaluating whether a defendant committed the prior act that the 
prosecution seeks to admit under Rule 404(b). Id. at 690–91. The court selected the lesser standard 
but noted that other safeguards protect a defendant from the prejudicial effects of such evidence. 
The opinion highlights the propensity rule, specifically the requirement that the evidence be 
introduced “for a proper purpose,” as one such safeguard. Id. at 691. 
126. Curtin, 489 F.3d at 944−45, 950−52; see also Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 685 (“Extrinsic acts 
evidence may be critical to the establishment of the truth as to a disputed issue, especially when that 
issue involves the actor’s state of mind and the only means of ascertaining that mental state is by 
drawing inferences from conduct.”). 
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sexual relations with a minor.127 The court declined to consider the 
prosecution’s alternate argument that the stories were admissible 
because they were “inextricably intertwined” with the charged crime.128 
The court nevertheless reversed the defendant’s conviction and 
remanded his case for a new trial, pursuant to Rule 403, holding that the 
trial court had abused its discretion by not reading all of the stories 
before they were admitted.129 As a result of the failure to carefully read 
and redact the stories, irrelevant and extremely prejudicial material had 
been introduced in addition to the material that pertained directly to the 
issue of the defendant’s intent to engage in sexual relations with a 
minor.130 
Five judges concurred in the court’s decision to reverse the 
conviction, but passionately critiqued the majority’s interpretation of 
Rule 404(b).131 In Judge Kleinfeld’s concurring opinion, the “pseudo-
dissenters”132 expressed concern about setting a precedent that could 
allow a wide variety of reading material to come in through the court’s 
newly opened door.133 The opinion also questioned the relevance of the 
stories, asserting that they were fantasy and therefore made it neither 
more nor less likely that the defendant intended to engage in the acts the 
stories described.134 These judges shied away from a complete ban on 
the use of reading material as evidence, and distinguished the 
defendant’s stories, which were fantasy, from a how-to manual that 
could be more probative of a defendant’s intent.135 Finally, the 
concurring opinion asserted that because “[p]erverse sexual desire is a 
                                                     
127. See Curtin, 489 F.3d at 948. 
128. Id. at 942 n.2. If the court held that the reading material was “inextricably intertwined” with, 
or intrinsic to, the charged crime, then Rule 404(b) would not provide a bar to admission of the 
evidence. See United States v. Soliman, 813 F.2d 277, 279 (9th Cir. 1987).  
129. Curtin, 489 F.3d at 956−59. 
130. Id. at 957–58. 
131. Id. at 959−65 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring). 
132. Although Judge Kleinfeld ultimately concurred with the majority’s disposition of the case, 
the bulk of his opinion addresses the majority’s Rule 404(b) decision. See id. Therefore, even 
though the opinion is technically a concurrence, it reads like a dissent. See id. 
133. See id. at 959 (“Can the government introduce a defendant’s copy of The Monkey Wrench 
Gang, Lolita, or Junky, to prove intent? DVDs of The Thomas Crown Affair to prove intent to rob a 
bank, or Dirty Harry to prove intent to deprive someone of civil rights? . . . Readers should not have 
to hide what they read to be safe from the government.”) (citations omitted). 
134. Id. at 961. 
135. Id. (“If a person is accused of planting a sophisticated bomb on a train, his possession of an 
instruction manual and the train schedule might tend to prove his guilt.”). 
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trait of character,” the stories violated Rule 404(b)’s prohibition against 
evidence introduced to show the defendant’s propensity to commit the 
crime.136 
Two brief concurring opinions followed Judge Kleinfeld’s 
concurrence. Judge Wardlaw, in her opinion, shared Judge Kleinfeld’s 
concern that “[t]he use of lawful reading material to prove intent is a 
dangerous business.”137 Unlike her colleagues, Judge Wardlaw did not 
read Shymanovitz as imposing a blanket ban on the use of reading 
material to prove intent.138 She supported the admissibility of reading 
material, provided that the trial judge “carefully weigh[ed]” both the 
relevance and the prejudicial effects of the evidence.139 The four judges 
who joined Judge Kleinfeld’s concurrence also joined a brief 
concurrence by Judge McKeown, which asserted that the court reached 
too far in discussing Shymanovitz.140 According to Judge McKeown, 
“[t]he bulk of the majority’s discourse [regarding Shymanovitz and Rule 
404(b)] is dicta”; the court could have and should have disposed of the 
case purely on the basis of Rule 403.141 
In sum, the original Curtin opinion interpreted Shymanovitz as 
substantially limiting the admissibility of reading material under Rule 
404(b).142 Re-hearing the case en banc, all fifteen judges agreed to 
remand the case for a new trial on the basis of the trial court’s harmful 
Rule 403 error. 143 Six of the fifteen judges, however, wrote or joined 
concurrences that sharply criticized the majority’s evaluation of the 
admissibility of the defendant’s reading material under Rule 404(b).144 
Despite the apprehensions of the concurring judges, the eight-judge 
majority announced the current rule in the Ninth Circuit: reading 
material is admissible under Rule 404(b) if it makes a defendant’s 
                                                     
136. Id. at 963 (“Using a person’s perverse sexual fantasies to prove action in conformity 
therewith is exactly what subsection (a) of Rule 404 prohibits. . . . Good prosecution proves that the 
defendant committed the crime. Bad prosecution proves that the defendant is so repulsive he ought 
to be convicted whether he committed it or not.”). 
137. Id. at 966 (Wardlaw, J., concurring). 
138. Id. at 965–66. 
139. Id. at 966. 
140. Id. at 965 (McKeown, J., concurring). 
141. Id. 
142.  See United States v. Curtin, 443 F.3d 1084, 1091–94 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc, 489 
F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2007). 
143. See Curtin, 489 F.3d at 959, 964 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring), 965 (McKeown, J., concurring), 
966 (Wardlaw, J., concurring). 
144. See id. at 959–65 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring), 965 (McKeown, J., concurring). 
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criminal intent “more or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence.” 145  
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT FAILED TO CONSIDER WHETHER 
THE EVIDENCE SHOWED THE DEFENDANT’S 
CHARACTER RATHER THAN HIS INTENT 
As numerous courts have held, reading material can be relevant in a 
criminal trial.146 The more important question, however, is for what 
purpose is the evidence relevant? In other words, is the evidence truly 
probative of a defendant’s intent to commit a crime—or is intent merely 
a pretext for admission of material that only shows a defendant’s 
propensity to commit a crime? When reading material is introduced as 
evidence of a defendant’s propensity to commit a crime, there is a 
danger that the defendant will be convicted for who he is and what he 
reads rather than for what he has done.147 This is particularly true if the 
defendant is interested in literature that may be unpopular, unusual, 
sexually deviant, or related to criminal activity.148 Because of this 
danger, courts should also be concerned that liberal admission of reading 
material will affect particular groups of people differently. For example, 
an individual with unusual sexual proclivities or an interest in true crime 
novels would be more likely to suffer prejudice through introduction of 
his or her reading material than would someone whose bookshelf 
contains nothing but Jane Austen novels.149 
The en banc Curtin opinion reveals a problem that plagues the use of 
reading material as evidence of a defendant’s intent to commit the 
charged crime. In addition to applying Rule 404(b) in an ad hoc 
manner,150 Curtin failed to address whether the admitted stories were 
                                                     
145.  See id. at 948, 959. 
146. See supra Part I. 
147. See United States v. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006, 1013−14 (9th Cir. 1995). 
148. See Guam v. Shymanovitz, 157 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2007) (observing that reading 
material that implies that the defendant is gay, or that he has unusual sexual proclivities, would be 
highly prejudicial where the defendant is accused of sexual misconduct); see also RICHARD A. 
POSNER, SEX AND REASON, 201 (1992) (observing that “so many people in our society” are repulsed 
by promiscuity and sexual deviance, and that incest has “a rare power to disgust”). 
149. See Shymanovitz, 157 F.3d at 1159 (“Under the government’s theory, the case against an 
accused child molester would be stronger if he owned a copy of Nabokov’s Lolita, and any murder 
defendant would be unfortunate to have in his possession a collection of Agatha Christie mysteries 
or even James Bond stories.”). 
150. See infra notes 153−157 and accompanying text. 
MURPHY_FINAL.DOC 6/10/2008 5:53:12 PM 
Swiss Cheese That’s All Hole 
337 
evidence of the defendant’s propensity to commit the charged crime 
disguised as evidence of the defendant’s intent to commit the crime.151 
As a consequence of this failure, the court subverted the purpose of Rule 
404, which excludes propensity evidence on the basis of policy, not 
strict relevance.152 
Before applying Rule 404(b) to the contested evidence, the Curtin 
court should first have considered whether the rule even applied to the 
evidence.153 If the stories were intrinsic to or “inextricably intertwined” 
with the charged crime, then Rule 404(b) did not apply.154 If the 
evidence was relevant under Rule 401 and survived Rule 403’s 
balancing test, the evidence would be otherwise admissible.155 Instead, 
the Curtin majority analyzed the evidence backward, first concluding 
that the evidence was relevant to show intent.156 The court then held that 
it was “unnecessary to consider” whether the evidence was intrinsic or 
extrinsic to the charged crime.157 
After Curtin rejected the view that Rule 404(b) permitted the 
introduction of only “bad” acts, the court considered only whether the 
material had any tendency to make it more or less probable that the 
defendant intended to have sexual relations with a minor.158 In 
conducting this straight-forward relevancy analysis of the sexually 
explicit stories, the Curtin court failed to appreciate Rule 404’s 
objectives. According to the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Michelson,159 “[propensity evidence] is not rejected because character is 
irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and 
to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record 
and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge.”160 
Therefore, even if the evidence of the defendant’s reading material met 
the low Rule 401 relevancy standard and, through “common sense,” 
                                                     
151. See United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 948−56 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); see also 
Ordover, supra note 71, at 148, 158. 
152. See supra notes 55–62 and accompanying text. 
153. See United States v. Coleman, 78 F.3d 154, 156 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Soliman, 
813 F.2d 277, 279 (9th Cir. 1987). 
154. See Coleman, 78 F.3d at 156; Soliman, 813 F.2d at 279. 
155. See Coleman, 78 F.3d at 156; Soliman, 813 F.2d at 279. 
156. See Curtin, 489 F.3d at 942 n.2. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 948, 951. 
159. 335 U.S. 469 (1948). 
160. Id. at 475−76. 
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made it “more or less probable” that he intended to have sexual relations 
with a minor, the evidence should still be rejected if it is being presented 
merely to show the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime.161 
Notably, after the Curtin court discussed Rule 404’s objectives at 
length, it failed to analyze whether the conclusion about the defendant’s 
intent first required an inference regarding his propensity to engage in 
this kind of conduct.162 “Common sense” and statistical evidence suggest 
that a person who commits a crime is more likely to commit a second 
crime.163 If the relevancy of the evidence depends on the conclusion that 
the defendant is a criminal who is prone to commit crimes, the evidence 
is still rejected on policy grounds—even if the inference itself is logical 
and accurate.164 Yet the Curtin court never considered whether its 
“common sense” inference about the defendant’s intent to have sexual 
relations with minors was actually a disguised inference about his 
propensity to have sexual relations with minors.165 As Curtin’s pseudo-
dissenters observed, “[p]erverse sexual desire is a trait of character. 
Using a person’s perverse sexual fantasies to prove action in conformity 
therewith is exactly what subsection (a) of Rule 404 prohibits. The 
exceptions in subsection (b) . . . are not a meaningless litany that deletes 
subsection (a).”166 
To support the admissibility of reading material, the Ninth Circuit 
relied on dicta from the Supreme Court’s decision in Huddleston v. 
United States. The Curtin majority quoted the following line from 
Huddleston no less than three times in its opinion: “[e]xtrinsic acts 
evidence may be critical to the establishment of the truth as to a disputed 
issue, especially when that issue involves the actor’s state of mind and 
the only means of ascertaining that mental state is by drawing inferences 
from conduct.”167 But Huddleston was not a case about the relationship 
of propensity to intent.168 Instead, Huddleston considered what burden 
                                                     
161. See supra notes 55−73 and accompanying text. 
162. See Curtin, 489 F.3d at 948−54. 
163. See supra notes 55−62 and accompanying text. 
164. See supra notes 55−62 and accompanying text. 
165. See Curtin, 489 F.3d at 948. 
166. Id. at 963 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring). 
167. Curtin, 489 F.3d at 945, 948, 951 (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 
(1988)). 
168. The petitioner in Huddleston asserted that, because prior acts have “a grave potential for 
causing improper prejudice,” the Court should require trial courts to determine that the defendant 
committed the prior act by a preponderance of the evidence. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 686−87. 
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the prosecution must meet to show that the defendant committed the 
prior act.169 Although Huddleston acknowledged that extrinsic acts may 
be critical to the prosecution’s case, the Supreme Court did not hold that 
impermissible character inferences become permissible purely because 
the prosecution has no other means of proving that element of the 
crime.170 In fact, citing United States v. Michelson, the Court stated that 
admission “for a proper purpose” other than to show propensity is one of 
several safeguards to prevent the wrongful admission of character 
evidence.171 
Similarly, in United States v. Stotts, the Sixth Circuit failed to 
evaluate whether the admitted reading material proved only that the 
defendant had a propensity to make explosive devices.172 In Stotts, the 
court summarily upheld the admission of the defendant’s bomb-making 
books without specifically finding that the book contained instructions 
for the explosive components found in the defendant’s home.173 The 
danger that a jury will have to draw conclusions about the defendant’s 
character in order to discern his intent increases in the absence of a 
connection between the explosive components found in the defendant’s 
home and his reading material.174 In other words, when the reading 
material provides blueprints for the discovered bomb-making 
components, a jury can conclude that the defendant intended to build a 
bomb without first drawing impermissible conclusions about his 
character.175 When the books are not directly linked to the bomb-making 
components found in the defendant’s residence, however, there is a 
greater danger that the jury will merely conclude that the defendant is a 
                                                     
169. Id. at 685 (“We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals as to 
whether the trial court must make a preliminary finding before “similar act” and other Rule 404(b) 
evidence is submitted to the jury. We conclude that such evidence should be admitted if there is 
sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that the defendant committed the similar act.”). 
(internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Notably, there was no dispute in Curtin as to whether 
the defendant had actually possessed the admitted reading material. See Curtin, 489 F.3d at 939−40. 
170. See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 685–91. 
171. See id. at 691 (citing Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948)). 
172. See United States v. Stotts, 176 F.3d 880, 890–91 (6th Cir. 1999). 
173. Id. at 890. 
174. Thompson v. United States, 546 A.2d 414, 421 (D.C. 1988) (“Where evidence of prior 
crimes can become probative with respect to intent only after an inference of predisposition has 
been drawn, the argument for admission is at its weakest, for the distinction between intent and 
predisposition then becomes ephemeral.”). 
175. See United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 111 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding admission of a 
bomb-making book that provided an exact blueprint for the bomb that the defendants were charged 
with detonating). 
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“bomb-maker” or a “criminal” and therefore had the intent to build a 
bomb.176 Rule 404(b) prohibits this kind of conclusion.177 Like the 
Curtin court, the Sixth Circuit failed to consider the relationship of 
propensity to intent, and thereby failed to guard against the possible 
introduction of character evidence disguised as evidence of intent.178 
In contrast to the Ninth and Sixth Circuits, the Eighth Circuit, in 
United States v. Johnson, refused to accept at face value the 
prosecution’s characterization of the defendant’s reading material.179 
When the prosecution offered the defendant’s reading material to prove 
that the defendant knowingly downloaded child pornography, the court 
evaluated whether the evidence was truly probative of the defendant’s 
intent to commit the crime, or whether it instead required an inferential 
step about the defendant’s character and/or his propensity to commit 
crimes.180 The court eventually concluded that the reading material did 
make it more probable that the defendant knowingly and intentionally 
downloaded pornography, but only if a jury first concluded that the 
defendant was the type of person who would download pornography.181 
The court then excluded the evidence, not because it was irrelevant, but 
because it violated the propensity rule and did not properly meet any of 
the 404(b) exceptions. 
The failure of Curtin and Stotts to adequately safeguard against the 
improper introduction of propensity evidence can have significant 
ramifications on the presumption of innocence in criminal cases. When 
courts accept “magic words” such as “intent” or “motive” without 
questioning whether the evidence admitted truly demonstrates the 
defendant’s intent or motive to commit the charged crime, the 404(b) 
exception can swallow the general rule against the introduction of 
propensity evidence.182 Instead, “[c]ourts must view with a jaundiced 
                                                     
176. See United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1436 (10th Cir. 1985) (“The Government must 
articulate precisely the evidentiary hypothesis by which a fact of consequence may be inferred from 
the evidence of other acts.”). 
177. See supra Part I.C.  
178. See Stotts, 176 F.3d at 890–91. 
179. United States v. Johnson, 439 F.3d 884, 888 (8th Cir. 2006). 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 889. 
182. Anderson, supra note 10, at 937; see also Kendall, 766 F.2d at 1436; Thompson v. United 
States, 546 A.2d 414, 420–21 (D.C. 1988) (“[C]ourts must be vigilant to ensure that poisonous 
predisposition evidence is not brought before the jury in more attractive wrapping and under a more 
enticing sobriquet.”). 
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eye evidence purportedly offered as relevant to some other issue but in 
reality bearing wholly or primarily on the defendant’s predisposition to 
commit another similar crime.”183 Ultimately, such casual evaluation 
destroys the presumption of innocence by allowing a jury to convict 
based on a defendant’s bad character.184 This is precisely the result that 
Rule 404 seeks to avoid.185 Rather, courts should follow the Eighth 
Circuit’s lead and specifically analyze whether an item of reading 
material reveals a defendant’s character rather than his or her intent to 
commit the charged crime.186 
IV. COURTS SHOULD EXPLICITLY EVALUATE WHETHER A 
DEFENDANT’S READING MATERIAL REQUIRES AN 
INFERENCE ABOUT HIS OR HER PROPENSITY TO 
COMMIT A CRIME 
Possession of lawful reading material, even fantasy material, can be 
relevant to show a defendant’s intent to commit a crime. Unfortunately, 
the line dividing a defendant’s propensity to commit a crime from his or 
her intent to commit the crime is difficult to discern, particularly where 
reading material is concerned. Therefore, courts should adopt a new 
analytical framework that will provide more consistency while offering 
greater deference to an individual’s First Amendment rights and the 
propensity rule. 
First, a court should evaluate the materiality of the reading material 
under Rules 401 and 402.187 If the elements of the charged crime do not 
require the prosecution to prove a mental state, such as knowledge or 
intent, then the reading material should be excluded as immaterial and 
therefore irrelevant under Rule 401.188 Second, a court should perform a 
basic probative worth analysis, evaluating whether the book has “any 
tendency” to show the defendant’s intent or knowledge of a charged 
                                                     
183. Thompson 546 A.2d at 420. 
184. Ordover, supra note 71, at 144; see also United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 963 (9th Cir. 
2007) (Klenfeld, J., concurring) (“Good prosecution proves the defendant committed the crime. Bad 
prosecution proves the defendant is so repulsive he ought to be convicted whether he committed it 
or not.”). 
185. Ordover, supra note 71, at 158. 
186. See United States v. Johnson, 439 F.3d 884, 888–89 (8th Cir. 2006). 
187. See United States v. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 1995) (observing that 
the first step of the analysis is asking whether the evidence “tends to prove a material point”). 
188. Id.; see also supra Part I.A (discussing the application of Rules 401 and 402 in the context of 
reading material). 
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crime.189 If the reading material fails at this checkpoint, it should also be 
excluded as irrelevant.190 
Third, a court should analyze the reading material under Rule 404(b). 
As a threshold issue, before applying Rule 404(b), a court should 
consider whether the evidence is intrinsic or extrinsic to the charged 
crime.191 If the evidence is intrinsic to the charged crime, then Rule 
404(b) does not apply.192 If a court categorizes the evidence as extrinsic, 
it should specifically evaluate whether the prosecution has truly offered 
the evidence for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b), such as to prove 
intent.193 If the trier of fact would first have to draw conclusions about 
an individual’s propensity to commit a crime in order to conclude that 
the defendant formed the intent to commit the crime, the evidence 
violates the propensity rule and should be excluded.194 Finally, if the 
evidence passes the Rule 404(b) evaluation, a court should conduct a 
Rule 403 balancing test, considering whether the evidence’s prejudicial 
effect substantially outweighs its probative value.195 
If the Curtin court had used this test, it would have analyzed the 
defendant’s reading material as follows. First, it would consider whether 
the evidence was material under Rule 401. Because intent was an 
element of the charged crime, and because the defendant had specifically 
placed his intent at issue by asserting that he had intended to have sexual 
relations with an adult pretending to be a child, the evidence was 
material.196 Second, the court would consider whether the evidence was 
probative under Rule 401. In Curtin, the defendant’s stories strongly 
suggested that he had an interest in sexual relations between adults and 
children, and that he was the type of person one would expect to cross 
                                                     
189. See FED. R. EVID. 401. 
190. See supra Part I.A. 
191. See United States v. Coleman, 78 F.3d 154, 156 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Soliman, 
813 F.2d 277, 279 (9th Cir. 1987). 
192. See Coleman, 78 F.3d at 156; Soliman, 813 F.2d at 279. If the court determines that the 
evidence is both relevant and intrinsic to the charged crime, it should proceed directly to weighing 
the evidence’s probative value against its prejudicial effect pursuant to Rule 403. 
193. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691 (1988). 
194. See Ordover, supra note 71, at 148; see also supra notes 69−80 and accompanying text 
(discussing how Rule 404(b) excludes evidence offered to show criminal intent if conclusions about 
a defendant’s intent are based upon conclusions about his propensity to commit a crime). 
195. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 916 (5th Cir. 1978); see also Huddleston, 485 U.S. 
at 691 (identifying Rule 403 as a barrier against the wrongful admission of propensity evidence). 
196. See United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 948 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
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state lines with the intent to have sexual relations with a minor.197 
Therefore, the stories were probative, as they tended to make his 
criminal intent more likely.198 The Curtin court ended its analysis at this 
point, but it should have taken additional steps. After determining that 
the evidence was relevant, the court should have considered whether the 
evidence was intrinsic or extrinsic to the charged crime. Assuming that 
the defendant’s possession of the reading material was extrinsic to the 
crime, the court should have then conducted the analysis required by 
Rule 404(b), evaluating whether the evidence was relevant to show the 
defendant’s intent because it showed that he was the type of person who 
would cross state lines intending to have sexual relations with a 
minor.199 At this point the stories should have been excluded because the 
stories predominately suggested that the defendant had deviant sexual 
proclivities, rather than that he had a specific intent to commit a 
crime.200 
An analysis of the first-aid book and the true crime novel described in 
the Introduction would proceed in the same way. The defendant’s intent 
to commit murder is at issue, and therefore both books are material. 
Because his possession of both books makes it slightly more likely that 
the defendant planned to murder his wife and to disguise his criminal 
intent by shooting himself, the books are probative. Therefore, the books 
would pass the Rule 401 and 402 relevancy checkpoints. Moving to a 
Rule 404(b) analysis, the next question would be whether his possession 
of the books was extrinsic to the charged crime. If the defendant used 
instructions from the first-aid book to keep himself alive after shooting 
himself, then arguably that book is intrinsic to the crime itself and would 
be admitted if it survived the Rule 403 balancing test. Possession of the 
true crime novel, which provided no direct instruction or aid to the 
defendant as he committed the crime, would probably be considered 
extrinsic and should therefore be analyzed under the Rule 404(b) 
framework. At this stage, a court would evaluate whether the conclusion 
that the defendant intended to commit murder would require the jury to 
first conclude that the defendant is more likely to commit murder 
because he reads books about men who kill their wives. Because 
possessing such a book shows criminal intent only if the jury first 
                                                     
197. Id. at 950−51. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. at 963 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring). 
200. Id. 
MURPHY_FINAL.DOC 6/10/2008 5:53:12 PM 
Washington Law Review Vol. 83:317, 2008 
344 
concludes that possession of the book shows the defendant’s propensity 
to commit the crime, the book should be excluded. 
CONCLUSION 
Reading material can be highly relevant in a criminal prosecution. 
This Note does not suggest that reading material should be entirely 
excluded from criminal prosecutions, but rather that courts should admit 
the evidence with greater consideration of the rights at stake. Reading 
material is a particularly dangerous form of evidence because it is 
constitutionally protected and because it is more likely to show an 
individual’s interests and character than his or her intent. Neither the 
First Amendment freedom of speech nor the propensity rule can provide 
any protection for a defendant if reading material is casually admitted in 
evidence under a wide variety of evidentiary rules. Instead, courts should 
adopt a clear, predictable standard that appreciates the constitutional 
significance of an individual’s chosen reading material. 
